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Abstract  
State laws employ different approaches in addressing the effect of pluralistic 
normative ordering in a multicultural setting. A legal regime may resort to the 
uniform application of state laws and reject religious and customary norms, or 
may recognize and allow the application of the norms and practices of identity 
groups as long as they are in conformity with constitutional and human rights 
standards. Another option is to adopt a hands-off approach whereby the norms 
and practices of cultural and/or religious groups are permitted to operate and 
are not necessarily required to meet constitutional and human rights standards. 
Against the backdrop of the notion of legal pluralism adopted by the FDRE 
Constitution, this article examines whether final decisions rendered by sharia 
courts in Ethiopia are required to meet constitutional standards (such as the 
supremacy clause, gender equality and non-discrimination). Based on the 
analysis of the relevant provisions of the law and literature, it is argued that 
decisions of sharia courts (whose jurisdiction is not compulsory, but based on 
the consent of litigating parties) seem to be exempted from constitutional 
standards even where they may be in conflict with state laws. 
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The 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution 
recognizes the ethno-linguistic and religious diversity in the country.  It does so, 
inter alia, by giving recognition to the settlement of disputes by customary and 
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religious systems on matters affecting the personal status of individuals. The 
plurality of sources of normative ordering sanctioned by the Constitution opens 
room for the potential discord between non-state (i.e. customary and religious) 
laws and state laws (including the Constitution and international human rights 
treaties ratified by Ethiopia). A case in point relates to matters that fall within 
the jurisdiction of sharia courts.  Such cases are to be resolved by Islamic law, 
which has normative and conceptual differences with state laws regarding the 
rights of women in general and their treatment in, among others, divorce, 
inheritance, and sharing of estate upon divorce. Decisions rendered by sharia 
courts using Islamic law could conflict, in general, with human rights norms, 
and can also, in particular, be inconsistent with rules on gender equality and 
other rules espoused by the Constitution.   
This article examines mechanisms, if any, adopted by the FDRE Constitution 
to manage the potential clash of state laws with Islamic law and the decisions of 
sharia courts. It also examines whether final judgments pronounced by sharia 
courts are required to be compatible with constitutional standards (such as the 
supremacy clause and human rights provisions).  As a prelude to this discussion, 
the article highlights the background of Islam in Ethiopia. It further discusses a 
brief history of the sharia courts in Ethiopia, the jurisdiction of sharia courts 
their structure and administration, and their place in the legal system. Moreover, 
two cases decided by sharia courts are reviewed with a view to shedding some 
light on the exercise of their jurisdiction and on their relationship with courts of 
law and the House of Federation (HoF) which is empowered to interpret the 
Constitution.   
Although sharia courts are set up both at the federal and regional levels and 
in the units of the Ethiopian federation, the focus here is on the Federal Sharia 
Courts. The discussion on the issues raised is based on the analysis of the 
relevant provisions of the FDRE Constitution and laws related to the jurisdiction 
of sharia courts. These laws include the Proclamation to Consolidate Federal 
Courts of Sharia (Proclamation No. 188/1999) which is alternatively referred to 
as the 1999 Sharia Courts Proclamation in this article, the Civil Code, the 
Federal Courts Establishment Proclamation, and the laws relating to the power 
of the House of Federation.  This is further informed by the relevant literature 
referred to in this article. 
I argue in favour of a hands-off approach which enables final substantive 
decisions on matters affecting personal status to fall within the purview of sharia 
courts by placing them outside state laws. To put it differently, state laws should 
not regulate final decisions of sharia courts, and in effect, final decisions 
rendered by sharia courts should not be expected to meet standards of state laws 
as long as the procedural requirements to institute a case before sharia courts 
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(which require the consent of the litigating parties to be adjudicated in a sharia 
court) are fulfilled.   
1. Background of Islam in Ethiopia 
Islam arrived early in Ethiopia soon after the advent of the message of Prophet 
Muhammad. Ethiopia is the first country that accepted Islam after Arabia and 
this happened following the taking refuge in Ethiopia of some of the followers 
of the Prophet owing to the persecution they suffered at the hands of the then 
powerful tribe of Mecca, Qureysh, to which the Prophet belonged.  The 
Ethiopian king offered kind treatment and is eventually believed to have been 
converted to Islam, after considering the message they were persecuted for.  As 
a result of the hospitality offered to the followers who sought safe haven and 
protection in the country, the Prophet ordered Muslims in general and his 
followers to respect and protect Ethiopians and not to engage in fighting with 
Ethiopians except in self-defense. This is found in the statement of the Prophet: 
‘leave the Ethiopians alone as long as they leave you alone’, and this edict is 
well-known by Muslims throughout the world and Ethiopia. 
During the following centuries, a limited immigration mainly from the Arab 
territories increased the number of Muslims in coastal areas around Ethiopia,1 in 
the present day Somalia and Eritrea. This enabled Islam to penetrate into these 
areas peacefully and Islamic norms took root gradually.  The presence of Islam 
in the area created discontent in the dominant Christian kingdoms in Ethiopia, 
which considered Islam a threat.  A significant conflict occurred in the 16th 
century during the campaign led by the Muslim leader Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim, 
commonly called Ahmed Gragn, who was from the currently eastern part of the 
country.  His aspiration was to weed out Christianity, end the leadership of 
kings who claim to have blood ties to King Solomon, and replace it with Islamic 
traditions.2 Ahmed Gragn’s campaign dethroned the Christian regime and 
established his own rule, under the banner of Islam, in the central part of the 
country for about 15 years and Ethiopia nearly became a Muslim state.3  
                                           
1 Hussein Ahmed (2000), Islam in Nineteenth Century Wallo, Ethiopia, Revival, Reform 
and Reaction, Brill, Pp. 30-35; see also Horn of Africa: The Region and Its History 
<http://www.law.emory.edu/ifl/region/hornofafrica.html> 
  (Accessed on 25 March 2011). 
2 Jon Abbink (1998), “An Historical-Anthropological Approach to Islam in Ethiopia: 
Issues of Identity and Politics”, Journal of African Cultural Studies, Volume II, No. 2, 
p. 114. 
3 John Miles (2004), Customary and Islamic Law and Its Development in Africa, Legal 
Brief Africa, African Development Bank, p. 136; See also Jan Abbinik (1999), 
“Ethiopian Islam and the Challenge of Diversity” ISIM Newsletter, Vol. 4, p. 24. The 
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One notable attempt by Christian rulers to forcefully convert Muslims 
against their will was made by Emperor Yohannes IV in the 19th Century, who 
persecuted those Muslims who opposed his doctrine of forcing Muslims to 
embrace Christianity.4 His aim was to outlaw the practice of Islam and foster 
national unity through mass conversion of Muslims to Christianity.5 The whole 
exercise was part of the grand ‘national integration’ scheme designed, ever since 
the emergence of the imperial state, for the purpose of putting in place an 
overarching ‘one national identity’ defining Ethiopian citizenship.  
Following series of campaigns of expansion of territory, the current frontiers 
of Ethiopia took shape under Emperor Menelik II.  There has been no significant 
clash between Muslims and Christians thereafter and the two religions have 
pursued peaceful co-existence.  
The emergence of the federal form of government in the 1990s has paved the 
way for express recognition of religious courts to deal with some personal 
matters.  Accordingly, the FDRE Constitution has allowed a favourable legal 
framework for the operation of sharia courts.  This gives rise to some questions 
regarding their jurisdiction and operation, and their relationship with organs 
such as courts and the House of Federation, an organ vested with the task of 
authoritative interpretation of the Constitution. 
2. Sharia Courts in Ethiopia: A Brief Historical Account 
Sharia courts have existed de facto since Islam was embraced in the country.6 
They acquired official state recognition after the Proclamation for the 
Establishment of Kadis Courts was enacted in 1942.7 The Proclamation defined 
the jurisdiction of sharia courts which are essentially the same with the present 
jurisdiction of the courts. It provided that the Government would appoint judges 
serving in these courts. This proclamation was repealed in 1944 by the Khadis 
and Naiba Councils Proclamation, 8 which established a three tier court 
structure.9  
                                                                                                            
fighting led by Ahmed Gran took place between 1529 - 1543. The fighting went on 
after his death in 1543 under the leadership of his successor.  
4 Bahiru Zewde (2001),  A Modern History of Ethiopia: 1885-1991, 2nd eds., Addis 
Ababa University Press, p. 48. 
5 Abbink, supra note 2, p. 115. 
6 J. Spencer Trimingham (1965), Islam in Ethiopia, (London: Frank Cass & Co.) p. 15. 
7 The Kadis Court Proclamation No. 2/1942. This Proclamation set up a two-tiered court 
structure- the Kadis Court that would serve as a court of first instance, and the Sharia 
Court , which would act as an appellate court. 
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The enactment of the 1960 Civil Code, which calls for the uniform 
application of its rules regarding all civil matters, put the legal status of the 
sharia courts in difficulty.  Article 3347 of the Code provides that “[u]nless 
otherwise expressly provided, all rules whether written or customary previously 
in force concerning matters provided for in this Code shall be replaced by this 
Code and hereby repealed.” Some contend that this provision repeals the law 
establishing sharia courts.10  According this interpretation, the repeal of the 
sharia courts by Article 3347 is implied as the Civil Code contains no 
exceptional provisions relating to personal laws of Muslims and sharia courts. 
Since the Civil Code repealed all previously enforced written and customary 
rules, there is no exception made to any group, and in effect, the argument is 
that sharia courts are no longer recognized and their jurisdiction to apply Islamic 
law is annulled.11  
 A contrary argument is that since such courts were in existence and applying 
Islamic law to some extent, the Civil Code, which makes no reference to the 
courts, did not intend to revoke their jurisdiction.12 In the midst of this debate 
regarding the effect of Article 3347 of the Civil Code on sharia courts, the 
Minister of Justice issued a circular which allowed the sharia courts to continue 
to exercise their jurisdiction.13  
The ambiguity regarding the status of the Sharia Courts under the 1960 Civil 
Code appears to have been deliberate. Ethiopia at that time was struggling to 
come to grips with the question of allowing a distinct law for Muslims.14  One 
can, therefore, realize the dilemma created by the desire for uniform law under 
                                           
10 Zaki Mustapha (1973), “The Substantive Law to be Applied by Muslim Courts in 
Ethiopia”, Journal of Ethiopian Law, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 140; James C. N. Paul and 
Christopher Clapham (1971), Ethiopian Constitutional Development: A Source Book 
Volume II (Haile Sellassie I University), p. 849, citing Robert A. Sedler (1967), “ The 
Development of Legal Systems: The Ethiopian Experience”,   Iowa Law Review, Vol. 
53. see also Ibrahim Idris (1999), “Sharia Courts in Eight secular African and Asian 
Countries”, a Paper presented at the Conference Reviewing the Draft Proclamation to 
Consolidate Sharia Courts, (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), p. 14. 
11 Ibid. In the family law section of the Code, the expert drafter of the Code, a French 
Jurist, Rene David, had incorporated, addition to Article 3347, provisions governing 
Muslim community. However, during the deliberations in parliament on the draft 
Code, the proposed provisions relating to Muslims were set aside and Article 3347 
was retained. See Zaki Mustapha, op. cit., p. 142. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. The issuance of the circular came following the request of the then President of 
Sharia courts for the continuation of operation of the courts after the entry into force 
of the Civil Code that put the status of the courts in doubt. 
14  Paul and Clapham, supra note 10, p. 849. 
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the Civil Code (legal universalism), and the competing need to recognize a 
religious law for the Muslim communities. Ultimately, the action of the Minster 
of Justice gave regard to the interest of Muslims and allowed the sharia courts to 
exercise their jurisdiction. 
The FDRE Constitution of 1995 recognized the sharia courts and it is the first 
Ethiopian Constitution to give such recognition to religious and customary laws 
in dispute settlement. Questions that emanate from the constitutional recognition 
of the courts are the subject of treatment in the last section of this article. 
3. The Role of Sharia Courts in a Predominantly Christian 
Country 
Although Ethiopia is the first country that embraced Islam after the Arabian 
peninsula, it is long considered as an island of Christianity. Christianity had the 
status of state religion up to the mid-1970s and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church 
had a significant leverage on the emperors of the country because they were 
required to have the consecration of the Church to secure legitimacy to rule the 
country.  The Church was also entitled to the ownership of a third of the land in 
Ethiopia, and it had a significant influence in the political and legal traditions of 
the country.15   
There has been tolerance between Muslims and Christians in the country. 
Yet, the state considered itself to be the steward of the Orthodox Church and 
relegated Muslims to a second-class status.16 Prior to the 1970s, Muslims 
especially in the Northern part, were excluded from the customary land-holding 
system.17 Moreover, they could not hold senior political positions, and were 
barely represented in various posts commensurate with their number.18 Muslims 
were also disadvantaged in the realms of education, employment, and other 
realms.19 Thus, they were mostly engaged in trade and commerce.20  
                                           
15  Christopher Clapham (1969), Haile-Selassie’s Government, Praeger Publishers, p. 
82; see also Abbinik, supra note 3. 
16 Bahru Zewde, supra note 4, p. 7; see also Abbink, supra note 2, p. 114. 
17 Ibid. See also Abdalla Bujra (2002), ‘Islam in Eastern Africa: Historical Legacy and 
Contemporary Challenges’, p. 4. 
18 Abbink, supra note 3, p. 24, see also Clapham, supra note 15, p. 83. Muslims were 
not allowed to assume any positions in the army, police and security apparatus before 
1974. See  Bujra, supra note 17, p. 4. 
19 Clapham, supra note 15, Pp. 83-84. The reason for what appears to constitute a 
systemic discrimination against Muslims has to do with the nature of Muslims in the 
country. Islam has emerged, in the words of Abbink, in the shadow of Christianity 
and has always been a secondary and inferior religion in the country. See Abbink, 
supra note 2, p. 113. 
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One wonders why the sharia courts received state recognition, tacitly for a 
long time before the 1940s, and expressly after 1942, under these conditions. At 
least three factors can be stated in relation with the de facto operation of sharia 
courts before the 1940s. The first factor may be ascribed to the prolonged 
periods of peaceful co-existence and the culture of tolerance between Muslims 
and Christians, which entitled Muslims to practice their religion freely.21 The 
second reason that explains their tacit recognition is that historically, the 
settlement of personal and family matters have been based on each community’s 
religions and customary norms.22 Moreover, the particular geographical location 
of most Muslims who were predominantly concentrated in the peripheries of the 
country made it difficult for state laws to penetrate into these areas.  
One could raise other factors for the state recognition of Sharia Courts in the 
early 1940s. The first may be attributable to the criticism levelled against the 
Ethiopian government, during the reign of Emperor Haile Sellassie I, by states 
such as Egypt for the treatment Muslims in the manner discussed above.23 The 
de jure recognition of the courts may, to a certain extent, be an act of appeasing 
foreign criticism and showing that Muslims had the right to be governed by their 
own religious law and that they enjoy freedom of religion.  
The second reason may have to do with the timing of the request of Muslims 
to set up the sharia courts. The request of Muslims came soon after the end of 
the brief occupation of Ethiopia by Italy from 1936 to 1941. To achieve its 
colonial aspiration and to attract support from one group against the other, Italy 
devised different strategies including the administrative division of the country 
along ethnic, linguistic and religious lines.  With this end in view, the Italian 
occupation systematically favoured the Muslims at the expense of the 
Christians. They recognized freedom of religion of Muslims, invigorated 
Islamic education, and introduced Arabic in schools.24 Muslims were 
encouraged to make use of the sharia courts as a ploy of getting their support 
and thereby creating division in the country along religious lines.25 This explains 
the proliferation of sharia courts during the occupation.26  
                                                                                                            
20 Bujra, supra note 17, p. 4. In fact, business activities in which Muslims have been 
engaged were despised by Christians and the ruling elite in the past and this also 
explains why Muslims were dominant in commerce and trade. 
21 Ibid; see also Paul and Clapham, supra note 10, p. 849. 
22 Miles, supra note 3, p. 137; see also Paul and Clapham, supra note 10, p. 849. 
Christians had such courts that deal with family issues but their jurisdiction was 
abolished in 1940s. 
23 Miles, supra note 3, p. 137. 
24 Abbink, supra note 2, p. 117. 
25 Italy had encouraged the use of local languages to create division along language 
lines as well. Accordingly, the Oromo language was made, for the first time, a media 
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At the end of the occupation, the Emperor accepted the request for the 
recognition of sharia courts possibly in order to prevent the threat of division 
along religious lines.27 This may indicate why the Emperor accepted the request 
of Muslims to set up sharia courts in 1942.  
The Government’s move in recognizing sharia courts and their jurisdiction in 
personal and family affairs are intrinsically tied with the preservation of one’s 
culture and identity.  On the contrary, the uniform application of the Civil Code 
irrespective or religion would have been strongly resisted by Muslims and could 
have led to social unrest. 28  
4. Sharia Courts under Ethiopian law: Contextualizing the 
Operation of Sharia Courts 
A brief overview of the relevant human rights norms under the FDRE 
Constitution and a brief outline about the legal system of Ethiopia are necessary 
in order to shed light on the structure within which the sharia courts operate.  
Moreover, they can enable us to look into the relationship of sharia courts with 
the regular courts and with the organ in charge of the interpretation of the 
Constitution itself, i.e., the House of Federation. 
The FDRE Constitution of 1995 has adopted a federal system and it has 
established a secular and parliamentary system. The Constitution gives due 
regard to fundamental rights and freedoms, and human rights are among the 
fundamental principles of the Constitution.  It is to be noted that nearly a third of 
the provisions of the Constitution deal with human rights and an entire chapter 
(i.e., Chapter Three) is devoted to human rights. This is not surprising given the 
fact that it was adopted following the demise of the 17-year military dictatorship 
                                                                                                            
language in the history of the country during the period of the brief occupation. The 
use of the language was banned after Italy was defeated and soon after the Emperor 
returned from exile in UK. The Emperor thought the use of local language would 
create a rift in the country and undermine the unity of the state. 
26 Mohammed Siraj (1999), “The Constitution of the FDRE Constitution and the 
Application of Sharia Law”, a Paper presented at the Conference Reviewing the 
Draft Proclamation to Consolidate Sharia Courts, (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), p. 8. 
27 This may be discerned from the famous speech of the Emperor emphasizing that “The 
country is common to all while religion is personal”, which was delivered to Muslim 
leaders and elders at the occasion of the day marking the end of the Muslim month of 
fasting. See Mohammed Siraj, supra note 26, p. 8. Following the speech, Muslims at 
the gathering asked the Emperor himself for the official setting up of sharia courts. 
28  Paul ad Clapham, supra note 10, p. 849. 
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in 1991 and at the time when the wave of democratization started to spread after 
the disintegration of the former USSR, marking the end of the Cold War.29   
The Constitution embodies a Bill of Rights under Chapter Three, which 
divides fundamental rights and freedoms into human rights and democratic 
rights.30 The civil and political rights stipulated under Articles 15-28 are more or 
less in line with the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, while Articles 
29-44 provide for democratic rights. Social and economic rights are embodied in 
Article 41 of the Constitution and other provisions which are relevant to these 
rights. 
The Constitution seems to have given a strong adherence to international 
treaties with respect to their domestic application. Article 9(4) provides that 
international treaties ratified by Ethiopia are the integral part of the law of the 
land. Furthermore, Article 13(2) of the Constitution requires the provisions on 
human rights to be construed in conformity “to the principles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and 
international instruments adopted by Ethiopia.” This, inter alia, requires the 
constitutional provisions on equality and non-discrimination to be interpreted in 
conformity with the principles of international human rights instruments to 
which Ethiopia is a party. 
Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law and equal 
protection of the law. Accordingly, it states that all persons are equal before the 
law and are entitled without discrimination to equal protection of the law. The 
provision stipulates that “the law shall guarantee to all persons equal and 
effective protection without discrimination on grounds of race, nation, 
nationality or other social origin, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, property, birth or other status.” To ensure that other laws are 
compatible with the constitutional provisions on human rights and equality, 
some laws, including the 1960 Civil Code provisions on family law and the 
1957 Penal Code were revised in 2000 and 2004 respectively. 
Article 35 of the Constitution, titled ‘Rights of Women’ reiterates the right to 
equality of men and women in the enjoyment of rights and the protection 
provided for by the Constitution.  The provision also states the equal rights of 
women with men in marriage, employment, and property ownership and 
administration. Moreover, Article 35(3) prohibits laws, customs, practices that 
oppress or cause harm to women and it champions affirmative action for women 
                                           
29 Mohammed Abdo (2011), “The Status and Enforcement of Social and Economic 
Rights under the FDRE Constitution”, Journal of Ethiopian Law, Vol. 24. 
30 Such distinction does not exist under international human rights instruments and is 
not the case with the conventional classification of human rights either. 
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to rectify the inequality between men and women in the political, social and 
economic realms. The Constitution thus provides a strong protection to the 
rights of women and forbids discrimination against them. 
The Constitution sets up a parallel court structure at federal and regional state 
levels. Federal Courts are competent to handle federal matters and state courts 
entertain state matters. Details of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, their 
specific structure and relationships, and administration are set forth in the 
Federal Courts Establishment Proclamation of 1996.31 Sharia courts pursue the 
same structure and they have a three-tiered structure: First Instance Court, High 
Court and the Supreme Court. The same structure is adopted by Regional States 
in establishing Regional sharia courts in their respective units.  
Sharia courts are found at both the Federal and State levels32 , and they are 
not part of the regular court structure. Consequently, their decisions cannot be 
subject to appeal to the regular courts of law. Once a case is submitted to civil 
courts, it may not be transferred to sharia courts and vice versa33. They can, 
therefore, be treated as distinct organs with a judicial function outside the 
regular judiciary.  
The FDRE Constitution does not grant power to courts of law in relation to 
the constitutional review of acts of parliament. The power to examine the 
constitutionality of laws enacted by parliament is vested in the House of 
Federation, which is equivalent to a chamber of parliament, in other countries, 
but is devoid of law making power.34 Thus courts of law at any level, including 
the Federal Supreme Court, do not have the power to proclaim laws enacted by 
parliament unconstitutional. In interpreting the Constitution and in examining 
the constitutionality of laws, the House of Federation is assisted by an organ 
known as the Council of Constitutional Inquiry. The Council is empowered to 
advise the House of Federation (HoF), investigate complaints on cases that 
involve constitutional issues and offer recommendation to HoF for final decision 
                                           
31 Federal Courts Establishment Proclamation, Proclamation No. 25/ 1996 (hereinafter 
referred to as the Federal Courts Proclamation). 
32  It is only one region, Gambella Regional State that has not yet set up Sharia courts. 
33 See Article 5(4) of A Proclamation to Consolidate Federal Courts of Sharia, 
Proclamation No. 188/1999. 
34 The granting of power to interpret the Constitution to the House of Federation is 
perhaps a unique arrangement introduced by Ethiopia as constitutional interpretation 
elsewhere is vested in the highest court of the land or a special constitutional court 
set up for such purpose. Aside from the interpretation of the Constitution, the House 
is entrusted with powers, among others, to decide on the right to self-determination, 
to formulate scheme for allocating budget to the units of the federation, and to settle 
disputes between the units and foster unity among the people. 
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on constitutional disputes.35 The HoF acts as a constitutional court but is distinct 
from a regular court structure and forms part of the legislature. 
Apart from regular courts, the FDRE Constitution recognizes the 
establishment of bodies that have judicial and/or quasi judicial functions that are 
required to follow due procedures.36 This indicates that courts do not have the 
monopoly over judicial functions. That is why Articles 34(5) and 78(5) of the 
Constitution recognize the resolution of disputes by customary and religious 
systems so long as the parties thereof consent to the settlement of disputes by 
such organs. It is based on this constitutional framework that Sharia Courts that 
deal with some personal disputes have been established. 
The recognition given to customary and religious courts to engage in dispute 
settlement implies that the Constitution recognizes the religious and cultural 
diversity in the country. This arrangement may raise some questions with regard 
to human rights norms, especially the equality clause, when it is applied, 
especially, to the rights of women. This is recently underscored by the 
Committee on Elimination of All form of Racial Discrimination. The Committee 
stated that it did not receive report on the measures taken regarding the 
application of religious and customary laws subject to the consent of parties but 
underscored that the state should take measures to ensure that the application of 
such laws would not lead to de facto discrimination against members of ethnic 
groups or against women, for instance, in family disputes.37  
The application of the jurisdiction of customary and religious systems is 
limited to personal matters and family disputes and it is interesting to see 
whether they should meet the constitutional standards embodied under Article 
9(1) which states that “[a]ny law, customary practice or a decision of an organ 
                                           
35 Article 6 of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation, Proclamation No. 
250/2001(hereinafter referred to as the Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
Proclamation). 
36 See Articles 37 and 78(4) of the Constitution.  However, it expressly prohibited the 
establishment of special or ad hoc courts which usurp judicial power from regular 
courts or institutions legally empowered to exercise judicial function. The aim of this 
provision is clear-it is to reverse the past history where such courts were established 
outside the regular court structure and had caused injustices against the accused 
persons tried by them, who in most cases received harsh decisions that were 
delivered contrary to all the rules of procedural fairness. See Mohammed Abdo 
(2010), “Civil Procedure: Monograph 55-Ethiopia,” International Encyclopaedia of 
Laws, Kluwer Law International, p. 8. 
37 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (2009), 
“Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the 
Convention: Ethiopia”, at its 75th Session, 3-28 August 2009, CERD/C/ETH/CO/7-
16, (7 September 2009, Geneva), p.  2-3. 
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of state or a public official which contravenes this constitution shall be of no 
effect.” This provision evokes the issue whether decisions of sharia courts 
should yield to the supremacy clause of the Constitution and norms of human 
rights. Owing to the fact that customary and religious values and rules are 
frequently raised as perpetuating discrimination against women, it is important 
to examine this question.38 
5. Structure and Administration of Sharia Courts 
As a prelude to the discussion on the structure of Sharia Courts in Ethiopia, 
some comparative look can be made at the structure of such courts in various 
countries among which we can use Kenya and Zanzibar as examples. Both the 
previous and the current constitutions of Kenya recognize the establishment of 
sharia courts. The Revised 2010 Constitution of Kenya recognizes the setting up 
of Khadis’ Courts, the equivalent of Sharia Courts in Ethiopia, and provides for 
their structure and jurisdction.39 The Constitution provides that the Khadis’ 
Courts are subordinate to the regular courts of the land.40 The Khadis’ Courts 
have a two tiered structure, Khadis’ Courts and the Chief Khadi, which serves as 
an appellate court.  As provided in the Act which is still in force in Kenya, 
appeal from the decisions of Khadis’ Courts can be filed to the High Court and 
finally to the highest court in the judicial structure, i.e., the Court of Appeal.   
In Zanzibar, the Constitution and a statute recognize the establishment of 
Khadi Courts with a structure and jurisdiction similar with that of Kenya. The 
final decisions of Khadi courts in Zanzibar are subject to review by the High 
Court, but unlike the practice in Kenya, the Court of Appeal in Tanzania does 
not have jurisdiction to see cases decided by such courts.41 The courts are thus at 
liberty to interpret the substantive Islamic law based on the nature of cases 
appearing before them. However, if there is inconsistency between Islamic law 
and the general law of the land, an express provision of the latter law would 
prevail over the former as far as that particular inconsistency is concerned.42 
                                           
38 In addition to Committee under the CERD, the CEDAW Committee also raised this 
issue during discussion on the reports submitted to the Committee by Ethiopia, see 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2004), 
“Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 18 of the 
Convention: Combined fourth and fifth periodic report of Ethiopia”, 646th meeting, 
27 January 2004, CEDAW/C/SR.646, (New York), p. 6. 
39 See Article 169 and 170 of the new Kenyan Constitution of 2010. 
40 Ibid, Article 169. 
41 See Article 99(2) of the Constitution of Zanzibar of 1984. 
42 H. Majamba (2007), “Possibility and Rationale of establishing Khadi Courts in 
Tanzania Mainland”,  Paper Presented at the Research and Education for Democracy 
in Tanzania Workshop (University of Dar Es Salaam), p. 12. 
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This means that the substantive Islamic law used by the Khadi Courts to dispose 
of cases should be compatible with express rules of the general law of the land. 
The structure of the sharia courts in Ethiopia is similar to that of the Federal 
and Regional State courts. It is of a three-tiered structure: the First Instance 
Court of Sharia, the High Court of Sharia, and Supreme Court of Sharia, each 
with its own Kadis (judges) and has a registrar and other personnel to run the 
activities of the courts.  The sharia courts are accountable to the Judicial 
Administration Council, an organ in charge of, among others, selecting judges 
and dealing with disciplinary matters of the judges of Ethiopia’s regular courts.   
Members of the Judicial Administrative Council are established, staffed and 
funded by the government. They do not form part of the regular courts of the 
land, i.e., they are distinct from the regular court structure and are not 
subordinate to the regular courts. Unlike the legal regimes in Kenya and 
Zanzibar, there is no possibility of appeal from the decisions of the sharia courts 
in Ethiopia to the regular court structure.  Article 5(4) of the Federal Courts 
of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No.188/1999 expressly provides that  
“[u]nder no circumstance shall a case brought before a court of Sharia the 
jurisdiction of which has been consented to, be transferred to a regular court; 
nor shall a case before a regular court be transferred to a court of Sharia”.43 This 
rule seems to have been designed with a view to delineating a clear line between 
the two different laws in the anticipation of the inevitable clash between the 
substantive law applied by (and the decisions of) sharia courts and formal state 
laws. The intention of Article 5(4), therefore, seems to enable the sharia courts 
to operate distinct from the regular courts. 
In considering matters that fall within their competence, sharia courts are 
required to apply substantive Islamic law. However, they are obliged to follow 
the rules governing civil proceedings used by ordinary civil courts. The 
substantive sharia law is, therefore, to be applied through the implementation of 
the Civil Procedure Code that governs the proceedings before ordinary civil 
courts. For instance, hearing proceedings, production and administration of 
                                           
43 It is not clear whether the word ‘transfer’ precludes a possibility of review by civil 
court of decisions of sharia courts, especially review by cassation exercised by the 
Federal Supreme Court. The word ‘transfer’ does not seem to have been intended to 
be used in the sense of the Civil Procedure Code whereby a case filed to one court 
may be transferred to another court if the hearing of the case is found to be 
inconvenient for the defendant owing to the location of the forum or if it is believed 
that there will be miscarriage of justice; See Article 31 of the Civil Procedure Code. 
Thus one could construe and employ the word ‘transfer’ in its wider meaning 
different from the ordinary usage of the term to merely refer to the transfer of a case 
from one court to another. 
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evidence, disposing cases and the execution of judgments of sharia courts are 
regulated by the Civil Procedure Code. The anomaly in the application of rules 
on civil procedures of ordinary courts to sharia courts lies in the fact that these 
rules of procedure may conflict with the substantive rules applied in sharia 
courts, as is to be briefly highlighted in the next section. 
6. Jurisdiction of Sharia Courts 
The constitutions and/or laws of many countries with a sizeable number of 
Muslim population recognize the need for the establishment of Muslim courts. 44 
In full-blown theocracies such as Saudi Arabia, Islamic law applies across the 
board, and Islamic courts are the courts of the land and have general jurisdiction 
on all matters. The courts have limited jurisdiction in secular states (with a 
significant number of Muslims) and their jurisdiction is mostly confined to 
matters affecting personal status that involve Muslims.  
For instance, in Kenya, the jurisdiction of Khadis’ Courts is over matters 
relating to personal status, marriage, divorce, succession or inheritance in cases 
in which the parties thereof are Muslims.45 In Nigeria, the jurisdiction of sharia 
courts is also regarding matters affecting personal status and family issues. They 
have jurisdiction over any question relating to the validity or dissolution of 
marriage involving Muslims or whether the marriage is concluded according to 
Islamic Law. Moreover, sharia courts in Nigeria assume jurisdiction with regard 
to family relationship or the guardianship of an infant, and regarding any 
question of Islamic personal law such as gift, will or inheritance where the 
endower, donor, testator or a deceased is a Muslim.46 
In Ethiopia, the jurisdiction of sharia courts is drawn from the Constitution 
and the establishment legislation of the sharia courts. The FDRE Constitution 
does not directly determine the specific jurisdiction granted to sharia courts, but 
rather recognizes the possibility of settlement of personal disputes by customary 
and religious systems. It does not define the personal matters amenable to the 
jurisdiction of such systems. However, the Constitution provides the general 
areas of competence (i.e., personal matters) and the condition attached (i.e., 
consent of parties) to the exercise of jurisdiction by sharia courts. The specific 
types of cases falling within the competence of sharia courts are defined under 
the Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No.188/1999 that was 
promulgated pursuant to Articles 34(5) and 78(5) of the Constitution. 
                                           
44 The courts could appear in different names such as Khadi Courts, Khadis’ Courts, 
Sharia Courts, and Cadi courts. 
45 See for instance Article 170(5) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. 
46 See Article 262(2) and 277(2) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
 
 
86                                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW                                Vol. 5 No.1, Spring 2011 
      
Ever since sharia courts were set up by official state law in the 1940s, the 
jurisdiction of sharia courts has remained the same, and the courts are granted 
mandate in two types of cases, which are stated under Article 4 of Proclamation 
No.188/1999.47 It is in fact in the areas of family law that the influence of 
religious as well as customary rules are most visible and the jurisdiction 
conferred upon sharia courts is made in recognition of this fact.48 As is clearly 
indicated in the provisions that deal with the jurisdiction of sharia courts, 
personal and family matters are the only cases to which Islamic law applies, and 
thus sharia courts do not have the power to deal with other matters. This is the 
case with sharia courts in many states that confine the jurisdiction of the courts 
to matters affecting personal status of Muslims, except full-fledged theocracies, 
such as Saudi Arabia where their jurisdiction is wider.49  
As provided under the1999 Sharia Courts Establishmen Proclamation and the 
FDRE Constitution, the condition attached to the exercise of jurisdiction by 
sharia courts is the consent of the parties. Sharia courts do not, therefore, have 
compulsory jurisdiction over parties on the matters that fall within their reach 
unless both parties demonstrate their express and unequivocal consent to the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the courts.50 There is no clear guideline as to when 
and how the consent of the parties must be expressed.51 However, one can draw 
the rules relating to consent from the Civil Procedure Code as the 1999 Sharia 
Courts Proclamation provides that the rules of procedure governing the 
proceedings before the sharia courts are those of the Civil Procedure Code.52  
Normally, a party who files a case as a plaintiff can be presumed to have 
shown his/her consent to the jurisdiction of the court. However, there can be a 
problem in establishing the consent of the party against whom a claim is made. 
The 1999 Sharia Courts Proclamation provides that along with the notice to be 
                                           
47 Article 4 of the 199 Sharia Courts Proclamation provides that the courts have 
jurisdiction on any question regarding marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship 
of minors and family relations; provided that the marriage to which the question 
relates was concluded, or the parties have consented to be adjudicated in accordance 
with Islamic law; any question regarding Wakf, gift succession of wills, provided the 
endower or donor is a Muslim or the deceased was a Muslim at the time of his death. 
48 The old and new family codes recognize the validity of marriage concluded as per 
religious rules and ceremonies. 
49  Zaki Mustapha, supra note 10, op. cit., p. 138. 
50  See Article 34(5) of the Federal constitution and Article 4(2) of the 1999 Sharia 
Courts Proclamation. 
51  Miles, supra note 3, op. cit., p. 142. 
52 Article 6(2) of the 1999 Sharia Courts Proclamation. A party who wishes to object to 
the jurisdiction of any court on the basis of want of jurisdiction can raise it as a 
preliminary objection under Article 244 of the Civil Procedure Code.  
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served on the defendant, a form shall be attached in which the defendant 
declares that he/she expressly consents to the hearing of the case by sharia 
courts.  It is possible that the defendant may not fill in the declaration but appear 
during the opening of the hearing of a suit and raise his/her preliminary 
objection orally against the exercise of jurisdiction by a sharia court.53 There is a 
tacit consent and a sharia court proceeds to hear a case, ex parte, if the 
defendant who has been duly served with the summons fails to appear at the first 
hearing of a suit.54 Some of the issues in connection with securing consent of 
parties will be reviewed in the next section. 
Another condition attached to the exercise of jurisdiction by sharia courts is 
that the jurisdiction can only be invoked where the marriage was concluded 
according to Islamic law, which normally means that the parties are Muslims, or 
where the parties (who may even be non-Muslims) consent to get their cases 
handled by sharia court.55 
7. Main Issues in relation to Jurisdiction and Performance of 
Sharia Courts 
This section examines the performance of sharia courts on the basis of the 
relevant laws.  Reference is also made to cases decided by sharia courts, one of 
which was reviewed by the Federal Supreme Court and the House of Federation. 
The cases highlight the relationship between sharia courts and the regular court 
system. 
7.1. Issues related to Securing Express Consent of both Parties 
Securing the consent of parties to the adjudication of a dispute in a sharia court 
is one of the debatable issues and it has led to the revision of some final 
decisions of the courts by the Federal Supreme Court and the House of 
Federation.  Some cases show that the final decision rendered by the sharia 
courts can be reviewed by the Federal Supreme Court and the House of 
Federation if it is established that no express consent was secured by sharia 
courts before it decided on a case. One famous case in this regard is the Kedija 
Beshir case.56 Kedija got a house following the passing away of her husband. 
Close relatives of her husband lodged a case to the First Instance Sharia Court 
                                           
53 This is derived from Article 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, which equally apply to 
the proceedings before Sharia courts. 
54 See Article 5(2) of the 1999 Sharia Courts Proclamation. This is in line with Article 
70 of the 1965 Civil Procedure Code of Ethiopia. 
55 Article 2 of the first sharia courts legislation (Proclamation No. 12/1942) limited the 
jurisdiction of sharia courts to Muslims only. 
56 Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division File No. 12400/1999. 
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with a view to claiming a share from the estate. She raised an unequivocal 
objection to the jurisdiction of the Court. In spite of her clear objection, the 
Court considered the case and finally decided on the claim filed by the relatives 
of her husband and forced her to relinquish the house she acquired. She 
appealed against the decision to the High Sharia Court and Supreme Sharia 
Court, and both upheld the decision of the First Instance Sharia Court.  
She submitted her application for the Cassation Division of the Federal 
Supreme Court, pursuant to Articles 80(3) of the Federal Constitution and 
Article 10 of the Federal Courts Establishment Proclamation. The Cassation 
Division decided against her by stating that there was no fundamental error of 
law in the decisions made by all the Sharia Courts that could lead to the review 
of the case.  
Acting on behalf of Kedija, the Ethiopian Women Lawyers’ Association 
brought the case to the House of Federation, the final arbiter of constitutional 
cases, by alleging that the adjudication of the case by the Sharia Courts against 
her express objection violates the Constitution. The House of Federation held 
the decision unconstitutional and stated its is regular courts that have 
compulsory jurisdiction and that sharia courts can assume jurisdiction  only 
based on the consent of the parties pursuant to Article 34(5) of the Constitution. 
It also rejected the reasoning of the Sharia Court that the requirement of consent 
under 1999 Sharia Courts Establishment Proclamation would not apply to the 
case because the case was filed prior to the Proclamation’s publication in the 
Negarit Gazzeta.57  
In Hajji Kassim Mohammed and Zenit Ali’s case 58 marriage was concluded 
before a sharia court judge in the presence of two witnesses.  Zenit’s two 
brothers and her uncle filed an objection to the marriage before the First 
Instance Sharia Court alleging that there was no consent of her parents and 
relatives to the marriage. Zenit’s relatives argued that under Islamic law parents 
and relatives must consent to the marriage. They claimed that they were never 
consulted and that the spouses did not invite them to attend the process before a 
judge. The spouses did not appear and express their consent to the jurisdiction of 
                                           
57 The Proclamation had not entered into force when the case was filed, but it entered 
into force when Kedija appeared for the first hearing of the suit. The Sharia Court 
held that the Proclamation would not apply to an already filed case but the House of 
Federation decided that what is important is securing the consent of parties indicated 
in the Constitution irrespective of whether or not the Proclamation had entered into 
force. 
58 Abdurahman Ali et al Vs Hajji Kassim Mohammed and Zenit Ali. See Miles, supra 
note 3, at 144. 
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the First Instance Sharia Court. Nevertheless, the court decided to annul the 
marriage.  
It appears that the court assumed jurisdiction because it considered failure of 
the parties to appear before it amounts to tacit acceptance of its jurisdiction. The 
law establishing the sharia courts provides that it can assume jurisdiction on the 
basis of an implied consent. Tacit consent may be inferred from the failure of 
the party to appear before the court so long as summons has been duly served on 
the defendant(s). However, the court did not investigate whether the summons 
has been duly served. The couple appealed to the High Sharia Court and then to 
the Supreme Sharia Court.  Both upheld the decision of the lower court.  
A problem worth noting in this regard is that sharia courts are lenient towards 
the interpretation of the consent of litigating parties to their jurisdiction. They do 
not usually ask the parties to give their express consent to the jurisdiction of the 
court upon their first appearance. The reason for this is probably because the 
judges assume that the parties have agreed, by virtue of their faith, to be 
governed by Islamic law; and thus they will be committed to it by their 
perceived prior consent. The problem is exacerbated by the behavior of the 
parties who do not usually express their explicit rejection of the jurisdiction of 
sharia courts for fear of negative perception and reaction from the Muslim 
community. Or they may feel that such an express objection will be considered 
as an affront to one’s religion. In effect, they may be put under social pressure 
not to demonstrate opposition to the jurisdiction of sharia courts. 
7.2. Procedural Problems related to Sharia Courts Proceedings 
The application of the Civil Procedure Code to sharia courts may compromise 
the effective operation of the courts. Islamic law in general has a less complex 
procedure in the submission and administration of evidence, on the number of 
witnesses, examination of witnesses, and hearing of parties. The application of 
the Civil Procedure Code could also be in conflict with substantive Islamic 
law,59 which is applicable in a given case. Lack of Islamic rule of procedure 
seems to have led the legislator to prescribe the Civil Procedure Code for the 
proceedings of sharia courts. Likewise, the Khadis’ Courts in Kenya are bound 
to follow the procedural rules of their regular courts until the Chief Justice puts 
in place rules regulating their procedures.60 The legislation establishing sharia 
courts in Ethiopia does not, however, authorize them to adopt their own rules of 
procedures.  
                                           
59 Ibrahim Idris (2002), “Status of Federal Sharia Courts under the 199[5] FDRE 
Constitution”, in Centre for Contemporary Islam eds., Islamic Law in Africa Project, 
Proceedings of Symposium (University of Cape town, South Africa). 
60  Majamba, supra note 42, at 9. 
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7.3. Lack of Codified Islamic Law and Inconsistency in Decisions 
Articles 4 and 6 of the 1999 Sharia Courts Establishment Proclamation allow 
sharia courts to adjudicate the expressly indicated matters in accordance with 
Islamic law. There is, however, absence of guiding substantive rules for the 
settlement of disputes submitted to sharia courts.  Thus judgments are usually 
influenced by the particular school of thought to which a judge adheres.   
In Sunni Islam, there are four schools of thought and three of them are found 
in Ethiopia, the predominant of which is claimed to be the Shaffie school.61  
Except for the basic pillars of the faith and some limited issues regarding 
primary sources of Islamic law (the Quran and Sunna), there are different 
opinions among Islamic jurists thereby allowing the flexible application of 
Islamic law. The judges may be from different schools of thought and this may 
lead to inconsistency in decisions in cases involving similar issues and material 
facts.  
This occurs especially on matters that involve the application of the 
secondary sources of Islamic Law (the scholastic consensus and analogy), which 
depend much upon the school of thought to which the judge belongs. Lack of 
codified and uniform Islamic substantive law to be applied by the sharia courts 
has thus created the likelihood of decisions to be inconsistent. The absence of 
codified rules means that there are no guiding rules for settlement of disputes 
submitted to sharia courts on different matters that come under their jurisdiction. 
It is to be noted that the presence of a codified sharia law does not eliminate the 
inconsistency in interpretation, but may mitigate the problem. 
7.4. Secularism 
Secularism is one of the basic principles of the FDRE Constitution and, in 
effect, the state and religion are separate - with each not allowed to interfere in 
the affairs of the other.62 However, sharia courts are set up, staffed and funded 
by the government although they are not part of the regular court structure. One 
could challenge the propriety of sharia courts on grounds of secularism, and 
may object the role of the government in establishing sharia courts and its act of 
providing them with budget. 
In principle, it is a legitimate concern to invoke secularism to challenge the 
establishment and operation of sharia courts. However, the interest of the 
sizeable Muslim population in Ethiopia seems to justify the exception to 
                                           
61 Zaki Mustapha, supra note 10, at 143. Although they do not identify themselves as 
such, one can also find Shia Muslims in Ethiopia in different parts of the country as 
manifested by their practice of the religion. 
62  See Article 11 of the FDRE Constitution. 
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secularism in relation to the jurisdiction of sharia courts. In other words, 
secularism is compromised in the interest of religious diversity permitting 
parties to choose the forum of adjudication in personal matters. To this end, the 
FDRE Constitution embodies a provision that guarantees parties to have choice 
of forum without, however, being subjected to the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the sharia courts.63 This is in concordance with the legal pluralism recognized 
under the Constitution according to which a compromise is made to the notion 
of secularism in favour of the settlement of personal and family matters by 
religious and customary systems. 
8. The Sharia Courts, the Supreme Court and the House of 
Federation 
The Federal Supreme Court has an extraordinary power of review of any court’s 
final decision through its cassation power as indicated under the FDRE 
Constitution and the Federal Courts Proclamation. Whether or not final 
decisions made by sharia courts fall within the cassation power of the Federal 
Supreme Court is examined on the basis of the Kedija Beshir’s case and the 
relevant laws.  
The Kedija Beshir case shows that if a sharia court proceeds to see and 
makes final determination on a case, the decision can be reviewed by both the 
Federal Supreme Court and the House of Federation. However, if one reads the 
provision of the Sharia Proclamation, a case filed to sharia courts may not be 
reviewed by ordinary courts and vice versa and this rule seems to bar the 
possibility of review of decisions of sharia courts by ordinary federal courts in 
general including the Federal Supreme Court. 
The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court reviewed the Kedija 
Beshir case on the basis of Article 80(3)(a) of the FDRE Constitution and 
Article 10 of the Federal Courts Proclamation. The issue that arises at this 
juncture is whether Article 80(3) of the Constitution is relevant to justify the 
cassation jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court to review final decisions of 
sharia courts even upon the failure of the latter courts to secure the express 
consent of the parties. 
As stipulated under Article 80(3)(a) of the FDRE Constitution: “The Federal 
Supreme Court has a power of cassation over any final court decision containing 
a basic error of law. Particulars shall be determined by law”. The phrase “any 
final court decision’ under Article 80(3) may not be construed to include 
decisions of sharia courts. This is because the scope of Article 80(3) is limited to 
the final decisions of regular courts, be it federal or regional courts, and does not 
                                           
63  Majamba, supra note 42, p. 18. 
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seem to extend to sharia courts as the preceding and subsequent sub-articles of 
Article 80 of the Constitution refer only to the regular courts of the land.64  
This interpretation is substantiated by Article 10 of the Federal Courts 
Proclamation that specifies the types of final decision of regular courts that 
qualify for review by the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court. The 
provision makes express reference only to regular courts and does not cover 
final decisions delivered by sharia courts.65 Moreover, the list of cases stated 
                                           
64 Article 80 of the Constitution:  
Concurrent Jurisdiction of Courts 
1. The Federal Supreme Court shall have the highest and final judicial power over 
Federal matters.  
2. State Supreme Courts shall have the highest and final judicial power over State 
matters. They shall also exercise the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.  
3. Notwithstanding the Provisions of sub-Articles 1 and 2 of this Article;  
(a) The Federal Supreme Court has a power of cassation over any final court 
decision containing a basic error of law. Particulars shall be determined by law.  
(b) The State Supreme Court has power of causation over any final court decision 
on State matters which contains a basic error of law. Particulars shall be 
determined by law.  
4. State High Courts shall, in addition to State jurisdiction, exercise the jurisdiction 
of the Federal First-Instance Court.  
5. Decisions rendered by a State High Court exercising the jurisdiction of the Federal 
First-Instance Court are appealable to the State Supreme Court.  
6. Decisions rendered by a State Supreme Court on Federal matters are appealable to 
the Federal Supreme Court). 
        It is to be noted that many proclamations stipulate that decisions of different 
tribunals are subject to review by regular courts. For instance, almost all 
proclamations establishing administrative tribunals such as the ones dealing with 
tax, labour civil service, and pension matters incorporate provisions stipulating 
that final decisions of such tribunals on questions of law are subject to review by 
courts of the law and in most cases the review is made by the Federal High Court 
and in a limited case by the Supreme Court as in the case of Civil Service Appeal 
Tribunal. Once decisions of administrative tribunals appear before regular courts, 
they fall under Article 10 of the Federal Courts Proclamation and Article 80(3) of 
the Constitution and one could still say it is cassation review of final decisions of 
regular courts. Such scheme is not indicated when it comes to the sharia courts. 
65 The Federal Courts Proclamation No. 25/96 provides that the Federal Supreme 
Court has a final judicial power over federal matters. The final decision subject to 
cassation review by the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court include 
final decisions of the Federal High Court rendered in its appellate jurisdiction,  final 
decisions of the regular division of the Federal Supreme Court, and final decisions of 
the Regional Supreme Courts rendered as a regular division or in its appellate 
jurisdiction. See Article 10 of the Federal Courts Proclamation. 
 
 
LEGAL PLURALISM, SHARIA COURTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN ETHIOPIA                                          93 
 
under the Federal Courts Proclamation that qualify for cassation review refers 
only to regular courts. The list embodied in the Federal Courts Proclamation 
thus confirms the interpretation that the scope of Article 80(3) of the 
Constitution does not include the final decisions of the sharia courts. In short, 
the Federal courts, including the Federal Supreme Court, do not have 
jurisdiction to review decisions rendered by sharia courts since the interpretation 
of the relevant provisions of the law does not confer such power on them. 
The House of Federation, as an organ entrusted with the authoritative power 
of interpretation of the Constitution, was involved in the Kedija Beshir case. The 
case culminated with the decision of the HoF which declared the final decision 
of the Sharia Courts unconstitutional on the ground that there was no prior 
consent of one of the parties to the case. The review made by the HoF can be 
justified on the basis of the constitutional provisions that mandate the House to 
make the final authoritative decision on all constitutional disputes and by virtue 
of the proclamations relating to the power of the House and its subsidiary organ, 
the Council of Constitutional Inquiry.  
The Council has the power to investigate complaints which claim that a 
certain law or a decision of state organ contravenes the Constitution.66 The word 
‘state organ’ includes organs with judicial function, and this seems to extend to 
sharia courts as they have such power.67  It then makes recommendation to the 
House of Federation on a decision to be adopted by the House regarding a 
complaint that gives rise to constitutional interpretation. The Federal Courts 
Proclamation states that a question of the constitutionality of final decision 
made by the sharia courts falls within the competence of the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry and the HoF. But, there is a limit to the power of the 
House of Federation to hear and make decisions on final judgments delivered by 
sharia courts. As will be discussed in the next section, the review made by the 
House is confined to procedural questions and not in relation to substantive final 
decisions of sharia courts. However, there is no case-law that supports this 
contention and the reasoning is based entirely on the arguments invoked on the 
basis of analysis of the provisions of the relevant laws and literature. 
9. Legal Pluralism, Sharia Courts and Constitutional Issues 
Legal pluralism is capable of different connotations, depending on the context in 
which it is employed. It mainly refers to the incorporation or recognition of 
customary norms or institutions within state law or to the independent co-
                                           
66 See Article 17(2) of Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation. 
67 Ibid, Article 2(6). 
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existence of indigenous norms and institutions alongside state law.68 Legal 
pluralism makes it inevitable that there are multiplicities of legal orders that are 
diverse, uncoordinated, co-existing or overlapping bodies of law.69 The diverse 
sources of normative ordering include official legal system, and customary, 
religious, functional and community systems.70 These different norms apply to 
different persons in the same situation.71 Thus in a heterogeneous society, the 
recognition accorded to legal pluralism realizes multicultural accommodation. 
This is why states try to facilitate practices and norms, for example, by 
exempting group members from certain laws, or by awarding identity groups 
some degree of self-rule.72 If the state grants various religious or and cultural 
groups self-governance over areas like family law (marriage and divorce), this 
increases the autonomy that these communities enjoy.73 
Legal pluralism and the resultant recognition of non-state laws are 
advantageous because they are said to be ‘closer’ geographically and culturally, 
more accessible and flexible, well-suited to address deep conflicts, relatively 
inexpensive. The overall burden of engaging with them is also considerably less 
than in the case of the state’s legal system.74  One of the demerits of legal 
pluralism is that it is not sensitive to human rights of individuals. Moreover, its 
downsides include non-conformity (or even difference) which may involve 
discrimination, and the potential for the emergence of competing clams of 
authority; and the imposition of conflicting demands of norms.75   
The diverse sources of normative ordering under legal pluralism can clash 
with each other and state laws, particularly when their underlining norms and 
processes are inconsistent, and such clashes are the most dynamic aspects of 
legal pluralism.76 This is best depicted in what Shachar called ‘the paradox of 
                                           
68 Brian Tamanaha (2007), “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to 
Global”, Sydney Law Review, Vol. 30, p. 390. 
69 Ibid, 375. 
70 Ibid, 397; see also International Council on Human Rights Policy (2008), “An 
Approach Paper: Research Project on Plural Legal Orders and Human Rights”,  p. 4 
71 Grant R. Woodman (1996), “Legal Pluralism and the Search for Justice”, Journal of 
African Law, Vol. 40, p. 160. 
72 Ayelet Shachar (1998), ‘Group Identity and Women’s Rights in Family Law: The 
Perils of Multicultural Accommodation’, The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 
6, No. 3, p. 286. 
73 Ibid, p. 289. 
74 International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra note 70, p. 5. 
75 Ibid, see also Tamanaha, supra note 68, p.  375 
76 Ibid,  p. 400 
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multicultural vulnerability’.77 There are different schemes adopted by states to 
deal with such discords through, for instance, provisions like conflict rules, and 
choice of law rules.78  Some of the specific provisions to manage the conflicts 
among different normative ordering include the following: 
a) One common arrangement is for the state legal system to assume a position 
of neutrality with respect to the various communities and religions, 
allowing a degree of autonomy to each.79 For example, there can be an 
exemption from compliance to state law such as the clauses in Zambia’s 
and Zimbabwe’s constitutions, which exempt customary norms from 
compliance with the constitutional standard.80  
b) Another mechanism is for state law to absorb competing systems. A 
common mechanism is to explicitly recognize customary, religious, 
economic, or community norms, or to explicitly recognize and lend them 
some support (which may be financial or enforcement).81  To this end, the 
state may, as in the cases of India, Pakistan or Niger opt to recognize or 
even create institutions outside the formal state legal system to mediate and 
resolve disputes.82 In other words, the state legal system recognizes the 
validity of private arbitration decisions, or even encourages parties to have 
recourse to such arbitration.83  The state may also allow the application of 
different normative ordering by limiting its scope.  For instance, the legal 
regimes in Israel, Malaysia, and Indonesia permit the application of 
different laws, especially those affecting personal status (such as marriage, 
adoption, and divorce) to different people depending on their religious 
identity, or, legal regimes may allow indigenous people to be subject to 
their own customary rules as in USA and Canada.84  
c) The other means is for the state official system to recognize the special 
status of customary systems but only in so far as they are not contrary to 
constitutional standards, as in South Africa.85  
                                           
77 Shachar, supra note 72, p. 289. The paradox of multicultural vulnerability is the 
phrase used to indicate the possible clash between the recognition given to cultural 
and religious groups’ autonomy over family matters on the one hand and the 
individual rights of vulnerable groups such as women, minority, and children in the 
society, on the other. See Shachar, p. 289-290). 
78 Ibid, at 400, and 403-407. 
79 Ibid. 
80 International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra note 70, p. 6. 
81 Tamanaha, supra note 68, p. 404. 
82 International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra note 70, p. 6. 
83 Tamanaha, supra note 68, p. 404. 
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d) Another option available is for state law to make aggressive efforts to 
subjugate the different normative systems that are in conflict with state law 
by declaring them illegal and trying to eliminate them.86 This constitutes 
part of an ‘abolitionist approach’ and, in relation to certain issues, it 
resonates the feminist stance that calls for the elimination of customary 
practices that contradict human rights.87 This approach rejects religious and 
cultural norms as mere sources of oppression of and discrimination against 
women.88 
In light of the above courses of action, let us see how the FDRE Constitution 
deals with legal pluralism and the relationship between different normative 
ordering (including the law relating to the Sharia Courts) and the concern for 
human rights issues.  
One of the challenges that legal pluralism poses to human rights relates to the 
uniform application of human rights in Ethiopia as envisaged under the 
Constitution.  There is a tension between legal pluralism (which is in favour of 
particularity in application) and the human rights instruments adopted by 
Ethiopia and enshrined under the Constitution (which are universal in nature and 
require uniform application). Different normative ordering recognized under the 
Constitution could, therefore, constrain the uniform application of human rights 
enshrined under the Constitution as their underpinning norms and processes are 
obviously bound to differ in many instances. This is most visible with respect to 
the constitutional guarantee of the rights of women in general and gender 
equality in particular vis-à-vis the treatment of women in the customary and 
religious laws and systems.  
Sharia courts apply substantive sharia law that has different perceptions and 
approaches to issues of gender equality. There are different ways of treating 
women in Islamic law that are to be applied by the sharia courts in such areas 
like divorce, partition of property, and inheritance.89 How can one reconcile 
                                           
86 Tamanaha, supra note 68, p. 404 
87 Celestine I. Nyamu (2000), “How Should Human Rights and Development Respond 
to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?”, Harvard 
International Law journal, Vol. 41, p. 392. 
88 Ibid; See also Rhoda Howard Hassman (2002), “Duelling Fates: Should the 
International Legal Regime Accept a Collective or Individual Paradigm to Protect 
Women’s Rights?”, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, Pp. 381-382. 
89 Islamic law applies different rules regarding inheritance, divorce, partition of property 
upon divorce on the basis of sex and offers rich explanations for doing so. For 
instance, a woman is entitled to half a share of a man in inheritance; a husband may 
divorce his wife through a unilateral pronunciation of divorce but the same right is 
not given to a wife. For the Status of women in Islam and their differential treatment 
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such variation in the treatment of women depending upon on the type of the law 
applied by the Sharia Courts, and how can these be reconciled with issues such 
as the principles of gender equality and non-discrimination enshrined under the 
Constitution? Which mechanism is used by the Ethiopian Constitution when the 
decisions rendered by sharia courts are alleged to be against the provisions of 
the Constitution or its human rights norms? Should decisions of the sharia courts 
be in compliance with the Constitutional standard? In other words, does the 
supremacy clause under Article 9 of the FDRE Constitution apply to decisions 
of sharia courts that are alleged to contravene the Constitutional standard set by 
Article 9? Do the human rights provisions that are enshrined under the 
Constitution override judgments of sharia courts that are found to be against 
these human rights norms? Can the House of Federation as an authoritative 
interpreter of the Constitution review final substantive decisions of sharia courts 
and declare them unconstitutional if they are found to be incompatible with the 
provisions of the Constitution?  
Unlike the constitutions of some countries (such as Kenya), the Ethiopian 
Constitution has not crafted an explicit rule designed to contain the potential 
conflict between state laws and the various normative ordering that it 
recognizes. Besides, there is no case-law regarding this question that could 
clarify the problem. However, on the basis of the analysis of various legal 
provisions, two broad strands of opposing arguments can be developed. One line 
of argument is in favour of the assertion that final decisions of the sharia courts 
should be compatible with the supremacy clause of the Constitution and human 
rights norms enshrined under the Constitution, and human rights treaties ratified 
by the country.90 One can also contend that final decisions of the Sharia Courts 
are not necessarily expected to be in line with the norms of the Constitution. 
According to this course of argument, the decisions of sharia courts should 
rather be treated as exception to the supremacy clause and human rights norms. 
Arguments in support of the first line of argument can be found in the 
provisions of the Constitution itself and the legislations that regulate the power 
                                                                                                            
and its justification, see Jemal Badawi (1971), “The Status of Woman in Islam”,  Al-
lttihad, Vol. 8, No. 2; Yusuf Al Qaradawi (2002), The Status of Women in Islam; see 
also, Hammudah Abd’ Al Lati (1998),  Islam in Focus, 3rd ed. 
90 Getachew Assefa indirectly holds this view on the basis of his brief comment on the 
Kedija Beshir Case. He seems to suggest that the decisions of sharia courts have to 
be in line with the fundamental rights and freedoms and his suggestion is based on 
the mere involvement of the Supreme Court and the House of Federation in the case. 
See Getachew Assefa (2008), “Assessment of Ethiopian Courts”, in National Judicial 
Institute, Independence, Transparency and Accountability in the Judiciary of 
Ethiopia, A research Report, commissioned by the Canadian International 
Development Agency, p. 110. 
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of the House of Federation. The Constitution contains a supremacy clause that 
provides that any law, decision of state organ or official and customary practices 
that are contrary to the spirit of the Constitution shall be of no effect. The phrase 
‘any decision of state organ’ can be constructed to include any decision made 
by the executive, legislature, judiciary, or any organ with judicial power. This 
includes, therefore, decisions rendered by sharia courts. Hence if decisions of 
the sharia courts are alleged to be in transgression of the constitutional 
provisions, they shall be of no effect. This means that any final decision of 
sharia courts should be compatible with the supremacy clause of the 
Constitution and other provisions of the Constitution relating to fundamental 
rights, including the rights of women. 
This line of argument is, in the final analysis, pursues the abolitionist 
approach. In the end, it essentially means the substitution of religious and 
customary norms by the state laws. It does not take note of the religious and 
cultural concerns and sensitivities involved in family matters subject to the 
jurisdiction of religious and cultural systems. This is because it ignores the 
values and essence of religious and customary norms as being a source of 
cultural attributes and social cohesion in the lives of many women.91 In 
customary and religious matters, women who assert their interests may not 
necessarily identify themselves as women, but rather in terms of other 
affiliations such as religion, culture, and ethnicity.92 This is the case in Ethiopia, 
particularly in areas where Islam has a stronghold, such as the Somali, Afar, 
Hararri, and East and South East part of Oromia Regional States. As a result, in 
the event of conflict between matters governed by religious and customary laws 
on the one hand and state laws on the other, one needs to give due regard to 
customary and religious concerns. Uncompromising antagonism towards 
religion can indeed be counter-productive. In effect, it forces women in the 
religious or cultural communities to choose between individual rights vis-a-vis 
spiritual or social cohesion, and they usually prefer the latter.93 
The arguments against the first perspective are also based on the Constitution 
which expressly grants constitutional recognition and status to the settlement of 
disputes related to personal matters by customary and religious bodies so long as 
parties refer a matter to such institution though their own consent. This implies 
that the Constitution acknowledges the difference in the norms and processes 
                                           
91 See Cheryl B. Preston (2003), “Women in Traditional Religions: Refusing to Let 
Patriarchy (or Feminism) Separate Us from the Source of Our Liberation”, 
Mississippi College Law Review, Vol. 22, Pp. 199-200; see also Rhoda Howard-
Hasman, supra note 88, Pp. 381-382. 
92 Rhoda Howard-Hasman, Ibid. 
93 Preston, supra note 91, p. 199-200; see also Rhoda Howard-Hassman, Ibid., p. 386. 
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between state law and customary and religious laws; and also tolerates their 
final decision in matters affecting personal status of individuals when the parties 
thereof voluntarily submit their cases to such organs. This argument is 
reinforced by the arrangement under the 1999 Sharia Courts Establishment 
Proclamation.  As stated earlier, Article 5(4) of this Proclamation provides that 
once a case is submitted to sharia courts after meeting all procedural 
requirements, it shall not be taken to the regular courts and vice versa.  
According to the second line of argument, this arrangement is made to draw 
a parallel structure between the two different court systems and thereby 
maintain the non-reviewability of decisions of one by the other. Hence, it can be 
argued that the supremacy clause under Article 9(1) of the Constitution does not 
apply to decisions of sharia courts even if the substantive decisions made by 
sharia courts are discriminatory in nature or in conflict with human right issues 
under the Constitution. This interpretation leads to the conclusion that decisions 
of sharia courts that may even breach constitutional norms can be treated an 
exception to Article 9(1).  
Unlike Zambia and Zimbabwe, the Ethiopian Constitution fails to explicitly 
articulate this exception. Yet, personal matters settled by religious and 
customary institutions need to be exempted from compliance with the standard 
stipulated under Article 9(1) of the Constitution.  Reviewing such decisions and 
declaring them unconstitutional is inconsistent with the role of sharia courts in 
adjudicating personal and family matters that are important to Muslims and that 
are also the manifestation of their identity. Such review also implies the 
imposition of uniform laws on Muslims regarding matters that are intrinsically 
associated with them. 
The Ethiopian legal regime pursues a compromise formula because it gives 
Muslims the right to consent to or reject the jurisdiction of the court, and at the 
same time avoids the uniform application of civil laws to Muslims who 
constitute a significant segment of the Ethiopian population.94 The pre-condition 
of consent of both parties on the exercise of jurisdiction by sharia courts protects 
                                           
94 Currently, Muslims are found in all parts of Ethiopia. They have a stronghold in some 
part, especially in Somali, Afar, Harrari Regional States and some Zones in Oromia 
(Bale, Arsi, East and West Harrarghe and Jimma) and in Silte Zone in South Nation, 
Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State. As per the Housing and Population 
Census of 2007, Muslims account for 33.9% of the population. See the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Population Census Commission (2008), “Summary 
and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census: Population Size 
by Age and Sex”, p. 18. A large number of cases concerning personal matters among 
Muslims end up before sharia courts, especially in area such as Afar, Somali and 
Harrari Regional States. 
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the rights of Muslims who do not want to be adjudicated by these courts. And on 
the other hand, personal law to be enforced by the sharia courts may be 
exempted from the uniform application of civil law for those who consent to the 
jurisdiction of sharia courts.95 So, if parties to a dispute voluntarily take their 
case to a sharia court, the outcome should be exempted from constitutional 
standards. Furthermore, subjecting final decision of sharia courts to the 
supremacy clause and the human rights norms of the constitution goes against 
the very essence of legal pluralism advocated by the Constitution. Thus, final 
decisions made by sharia courts on matters within their remit have to be 
considered in the context of legal pluralism and be treated as a compromise to 
the constitutional standard set under Article 9(1).   
However, the House of Federation is entitled to review final decisions made 
by sharia courts. But, for the aforementioned reasons, the scope of its power is 
limited to procedural questions such as failure to comply with express consent, 
or where sharia courts exceed the mandate granted to them under Articles 34 
and 78 of the Constitution. Thus the authority of the House of Federation to 
review and examine the constitutionality of the outcome of final decisions of 
sharia courts should be limited even if the decisions may be inconsistent with a 
provision embodied in the Constitution.  
If final decisions rendered by the sharia courts are reviewed by the House of 
Federation and finally declared unconstitutional, this may be treated by Muslim 
communities as an onslaught on their religious values and identity. This may 
trigger a counter-measure towards a stricter interpretation and practices. In the 
words of Shachar, such measure is called a ‘reactive culturalism’. It arises from 
a reaction of identity group’s active resistance to external forces of change and 
entails a strict adherence to the group’s traditional laws, norms and practices.96 
A well-intentioned attempt to protect the rights of women may thus be perceived 
by religious and identity groups as an external pressure or threat to its values 
and identity and may then lead to a firm assertion of and obedience to their faith 
and values and even put women in a strict cultural, social and legal position.  
                                           
95 Article 74 of the Revised Family Code provides that effects of marital ties are 
regulated by the Code whether a marriage is concluded as per civil, customary or 
religious system. However, as discussed earlier, marriage concluded according to 
Islamic law is exempt from the application of this rule so long as the parties thereof 
consent to settle their case by the application of Islamic law. This does not mean that 
the effect of marriage concluded according to Islamic rule is governed by Islamic law 
automatically. The Islamic law applies only when a dispute arises and the parties opt 
for the Sharia Courts. 
96 Ayelet Shachar (2001), Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and 
Women’s Rights, Cambridge University Press, p. 35. 
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The reaction of Indian Muslims to a decision of the Supreme Court of the 
country in one case enlightens the reaction of the Muslim community to what 
they perceived was an external threat to their identity and its consequences to 
the rights of women. The ruling of the Supreme Court of India in 1985 in a case 
that involved family matters generated fury and propelled a vigorous campaign 
by Muslims on the ground that the decision would impose the values of the 
majority Hindus on the minority Indian Muslims. The protests culminated in the 
enactment of legislation by parliament that exempted Muslim women from state 
laws on personal matters related to divorce thereby eliminating the protection 
they had under the state law.97 A genuine restructuring of the differential 
treatment of women in religious and customary systems should not, therefore, 
be imposed on the system. As underscored by Shachar, the presence of state 
jurisdiction as a competitive optional forum in itself creates a spur for the 
religious and customary systems to react to the needs of the vulnerable groups 
or else risk losing members dissatisfied with the system.98 
                                           
97 The case was between Mohammed Ahmed Khan v. Shah BanoBegum, decided on by 
the Indian Supreme Court in 1985. The facts of the case, taken from Shachar’s work, 
are the following: A Muslim woman, Shah Bano, was divorced by her husband, 
Mohammed Ahmed Khan, of more than forty years by way of a unilateral (talaq) 
divorce following a three year separation. Shah Bano lodged a case to the lower 
courts seeking maintenance payments from her ex-husband. The case finally reached 
the Supreme Court of India, which delivered a decision in her favour. The decision 
of the Supreme Court that was in favour of Shah Bano was perceived by the 
representatives of the Muslim minority community as attestation of attempts by the 
Hindu majority to undermine the identity of the minority Muslims. In response to the 
decision, Muslim religious leaders embarked on a massive political campaign in 
which they demanded that the government to “exempt” Muslim women from 
resorting to state law in determining the pecuniary effects of a religious divorce, thus 
depriving them of rights and remedies available to fellow Indian female citizens. The 
Indian Parliament conceded to the pressures of the campaigns of Muslims. It 
overruled the Court’s decision in Shah Bano by promulgating an Act that protects the 
rights of Muslim women upon divorce. The legislation stripped off the rights of 
Muslim women to appeal to state courts for post-divorce maintenance payments. In 
addition, it relieved Indian Muslim ex-husbands from other post-divorce obligations 
toward their children. As a result, the legislation deprives Indian Muslim women of 
the benefits that they would receive if they lived in Egypt, as well as many other 
Muslim countries where Sharia family law codes are applied through state courts. 
For the facts of the case and its effects on the rights of Muslim women, see Ayelet 
Shachar, Religion (2005), “State, and the Problem of Gender: New Modes of 
Citizenship and Governance in Diverse Societies”, McGill Law Journal, Vol. 50, No. 
1, p. 68.  
98 Shachar, supra note 96, pp. 140-141. 
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In short, the second line of argument appears to be sound by virtue of the 
schemes of legal pluralism adopted by the Constitution and the 1999 Sharia 
Courts Proclamation. The other abolitionist option thus violates legal pluralism 
to the detriment of sensitive concerns in religious and customary practices and 
norms related to family matters.  
10. Implication to International Human Rights Obligations 
The argument that final decisions of Sharia Courts have to be treated as 
exception to the constitutional standards has an implication to international 
human rights instruments ratified by Ethiopia. It triggers questions about 
Ethiopia’s commitment under various human rights instruments ratified by the 
country that contain provisions prohibiting discrimination against women.99 
Personal status laws in Ethiopia, which could also fall within the jurisdiction of 
sharia courts, are often considered the area of the law in which discrimination is 
entrenched on the ground of gender.100 That is why a state party to, for instance, 
the CEDAW is obliged to fight cultural practices that discriminate women.  To 
this end, a state party is under obligation to undertake appropriate measures in 
order to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating marriage 
and family relations.101 
The constitutional provisions that give recognition to customary and religious 
institutions in the settlement of personal disputes (subject to the consent of 
parties) may not be in conformity with the provisions of these international 
human rights instruments. This in turn triggers issues related to the status of 
international human rights under the Federal constitution, which in itself is a 
subject of debate in Ethiopia and in itself can become a separate topic for 
                                           
99 Ethiopia has become a party to the CEDAW in 1981. It signed it on 8 July 1980 and 
ratified it on 10 September1981. 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&lang=en> (Accessed on 11 June 2011). The reservation Ethiopia made 
to the Convention upon the ratification is on paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the 
Convention and the then government expressed that it would not be bound by the 
stated paragraph. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women: Declarations, reservations, objections and notifications of 
withdrawal of reservations relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, UN, CEDAW/SP/2006/2,Geneva, 2006; 
See <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/309/97/PDF/N0630997.pdf?OpenElement> 
(Accessed on 11 June 2011). 
100 Jasmine Mousa (2005), The Reform of Sharia-derived Divorce Legislation in Egypt: 
International Standards and the Culture Debate, p. 1. 
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discussion.102 What appears to be impliedly evident from the interpretation of 
the Constitution is that the particularity of application of some human rights 
issues as related to personal matters are given preference over universal 
application of human rights as well as national laws. This is done with the 
objective of accommodating, to some extent, religious and customary rules 
governing personal status when parties mutually choose such rules in the 
settlement of their disputes.  
Concluding Remarks 
The sharia courts have not been performing well with respect to the rights and 
concerns of women.103 It has been alleged that women would not tend to prefer 
them for resolution of family and personal disputes as a result of the differential 
treatment of women in Islamic law.104 However, the problem is usually 
attributable to the prejudices of judges in sharia courts towards the position and 
status of women in the customary norms of the society.105  In the Ethiopian 
context, the application of sharia law is influenced by the customary rules of a 
region or a dominant ethnic group, which in many instances are not in tune with 
                                           
102 See the following literature in relation to the status of international human rights 
treaties in Ethiopia: Rakeb Messele (2003), “Enforcement of Human Rights in 
Ethiopia”, Research Report, APAP (Addis Ababa), Gebreamlak Gebregiorgis 
(2008), “The Incorporation and Status of International Human Rights under the 
FDRE Constitution”, in Girmachew Alemu and Sisay Alemahu, eds., “The 
Constitutional Protection of Human Rights in Ethiopia: Challenges and Prospects’, 
Ethiopian Human Rights Law Series, Vol. 2, Faculty of Law, AAU; Sisay Alemahu 
(2008), ‘The Justiciability of Human Rights in the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia’, African Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 8; Chi Mgbako, et al (2008), 
“Silencing the Ethiopian Courts: Non-Judicial Constitutional Review and its Impact 
on Human Rights”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1; Takele 
Seboka (2009), “The Monist-Dualist Divide and the Supremacy Clause: Revisiting 
the Status of Human Rights Treaties in Ethiopia”, Journal of Ethiopian Law, Vol. 
23, No. 1; Mohammed Abdo (2011), “The Status and Enforcement of Social and 
Economic Rights under the FDRE Constitution”, Vol. 24, Journal of Ethiopian Law. 
103  Communiqué of Addis Ababa Muslim Women’s Council (2003), at 1. 
104 Original Woldegioris (2002), “Democratization Process and Gender”, in Bahru 
Zewde and Siegfried Pausewang, Ethiopia: The Challenge of Democracy from 
Below, Elanders Gotab ( Sweden), p. 175. 
105 It does not mean that Islamic law does not have rules contradictory to human rights 
norms. The sharia law enforced by sharia courts make a different treatment on the 
basis of gender as mentioned earlier. Of course, there are ample justifications for 
preferential treatment on the basis of gender in Islamic law. For details read Jemal 
Bedawi and Yusuf Al Qaradawi, supra note 89. 
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the rights of women.106 This may have a role in shaping the mindsets and views 
of judges in matters involving women. 
The jurisdiction granted to sharia courts raises questions and concerns about 
human rights provisions enshrined under the FDRE Constitution regarding 
gender equality and protection against discrimination. However, the 
Constitution has not provided a specific mechanism as to how decisions of 
sharia courts that are in conflict with constitutional standards can be dealt with. 
In other words, the Constitution fails to clearly state whether its supremacy 
clause and provisions on human rights prevail over final decisions of sharia 
courts that are in conflict with them.  
As indicated in the preceding discussion, the Constitution seems to have 
recognized the final decisions delivered by sharia courts as exception to its 
supremacy clause and human rights norms. This seems to have been made 
mainly in favour of legal pluralism.  With regard to the potential for conflict 
between the decisions of sharia courts and human rights instruments, the legal 
pluralism enshrined in the Ethiopian Constitution and the 1999 Sharia Courts 
Proclamation seem to have pursued the notion of ‘cultural relativism’ in 
personal matters rather than the universality of human rights. This is because the 
FDRE Constitution recognizes parallel personal and family laws based ethno-
religious frameworks and such structure has to be maintained if the parties opt 
for such systems.  
The concerns of the ‘abolitionist’ option can be addressed by raising the 
awareness of women so that they can make informed decision as to which forum 
is to their best interest. Such pursuits coupled with the power of the state to 
encourage and facilitate reforms regarding the treatment of gender issues in the 
sharia courts as well as customary systems can indeed gradually address the 
constitutional and human rights concerns discussed in this article.                     ■ 
 
                                           
106 Ibid. 
